The book also considers meditation and some other pain control techniques. Deceit and the ability to detect deception are explored in detail. In the area of self-assessment techniques for career development, the volume evaluates the widely used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.
Mulholland was recruited by Sidney Gottleib in 1953, for the top secret CIA project known as "MK-ULTRA". His assignments included working with billionaires and inventors, cracking codes and delving into the world of ESP research, experiments with the use of LSD, and writing a manual on deception for use in the Cold War.
The CIA's manual about magic is now available. It served to teach staff about recognizing mis-directionand other "evidence" masking deceptions. Article is here: -lost-magic-manual-resurfaces/Boston Globe summary is here: _illusion/CIA's Lost Magic Manual ResurfacesWired.com By Noah Shachtman November 24, 2009 | 1:37 pm | Categories: Spies, Secrecy and SurveillanceAt the height of the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency paid $3,000 to renowned magician John Mulholland to write a manual on misdirection, concealment, and stagecraft. All known copies of the document -- and a related paper, on conveying hidden signals -- were believed to be destroyed in 1973. But recently, the manuals resurfaced, and have now been published as "The Official CIA Manual of Trickery and Deception." Topics include working a clandestine partner, slipping a pill into the drink of the unsuspecting, and "surreptitious removal of objects by women."This wasn't the first time a magician worked for a western government. Harry Houdini snooped on the German and the Russian militiaries for Scotland Yard. English illusionist Jasper Maskelyne is reported to created dummy submarines and fake tanks to distract Rommel's army during World War II. Some reports even credit him with employing flashing lights to "hide" the Suez Canal.But Mulholland's contributions were far different, because they were part of a larger CIA effort, called MK-ULTRA, to control people's minds. Which lead to the Agency's infatuation with LSD, as David Hambling recounted here a few weeks ago:In the infamous Operation Midnight Climax, unwitting clients at CIA brothels in New York and San Francisco were slipped LSD and then monitored through one-way mirrors to see how they reacted. They even killed an elephant with LSD. Colleagues were also considered fair game for secret testing, to the point where a memo was issued instructing that the punch bowls at office Christmas parties were not to be spiked.The Boston Globe has put together a great visual summary of some of Mulholland's best tricks for the CIA: the shoelace pattern that means "follow me"; the hidden compartment to smuggle in an agent; the best ways to appear dumb and non-threatening. Because there's no better misdirection than appearing to be a fool. -- Daniel Meatte (email)
Military deception (MILDEC) is an attempt by a military unit to gain an advantage during warfare by misleading adversary decision makers into taking action or inaction that creates favorable conditions for the deceiving force. This is usually achieved by creating or amplifying an artificial fog of war via psychological operations, information warfare, visual deception, or other methods. As a form of disinformation, it overlaps with psychological warfare. Military deception is also closely connected to operations security (OPSEC) in that OPSEC attempts to conceal from the adversary critical information about an organization's capabilities, activities, limitations, and intentions, or provide a plausible alternate explanation for the details the adversary can observe, while deception reveals false information in an effort to mislead the adversary.
Deception in warfare dates back to early history. The Art of War, an ancient Chinese military treatise, emphasizes the importance of deception as a way for outnumbered forces to defeat larger adversaries. Examples of deception in warfare can be found in ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, the Medieval Age, the Renaissance, and the European Colonial Era. Deception was employed during World War I and came into even greater prominence during World War II. In modern times, the militaries of several nations have evolved deception tactics, techniques and procedures into fully fledged doctrine.
Many standard military activities can be considered deceptive, but not deception. For example, a unit may move into an assembly area to complete organizing and rehearsing prior to a mission. It is a standard deceptive tactic to camouflage the vehicles, equipment and personnel in the assembly area with the intent of confusing the enemy. Military deception is more complex than simple deceptive activities, with a unit deliberately planning and carrying out an elaborate effort that will cause a targeted adversary decision maker to take an action that is detrimental to the adversary and beneficial to the side employing deception.
The Operation Bodyguard deception in World War II can be viewed as an ambiguity increasing deception that over time became ambiguity decreasing. Initially, the aim was to increase confusion among German planners and leaders by presenting the possibilities of Allied invasions at the Pas-de-Calais and Normandy in France, as well as the Balkans, southern France, and Norway. Eventually, the deception increased certainty on the German side by causing them to conclude that Calais was the real invasion site. When the Allies attacked at Normandy, they did so with the advantage of surprise.
The development of modern military deception doctrine has led to the codification of several rules and maxims. In U.S. doctrine, three of the most important are expressed as Magruder's Principle, the Jones' Dilemma, and Care In the Placement of Deceptive Material (Avoid Windfalls).
Magruder's Principle: Named for Confederate general John B. Magruder, this principle states that it usually easier to deceive a deception target into holding on to a pre-existing belief than it is to convince the target that something the target believes to be true is not. Examples include the Allies of World War II making use in the Operation Mincemeat deception of the pre-existing German belief that Greece and the Balkans would be their next invasion target after North Africa, when the Allies actually intended to invade Sicily.
Jones' Dilemma: Named for British scientist Reginald Victor Jones, who played an important role in the Allied effort during World War II, the Jones dilemma indicates that the greater the number of intelligence and information gathering and transmitting resources available to the deception target, the more difficult it is to deceive the target. Conversely, the more of the target's intelligence and information systems that are manipulated in a deception plan or denied to the target, the more likely the target is to believe the deception. One reason the World War II Operation Bodyguard deception was accepted as true on the German side is that Germany's ability to acquire information about activities in England was limited, enabling the Allies to manipulate the few German intelligence gathering resources that were available.
Avoid Windfalls: If a deception target obtains deceptive information too easily ("too good to be true"), the target is unlikely to act on it and the deception will fail. This requires deception planners to take care in placing deceptive information so that it will appear to have been acquired in a seemingly natural manner. The deception target is then able to assemble details from multiple sources into a coherent, believable, but untrue story. The best deception plans co-opt the enemy's skepticism through requiring enemy participation, either by expending time and resources in obtaining the deceptive information, or by devoting significant effort to interpreting it. In an example of valid information being dismissed as a windfall, early in World War II a plane carrying German officers to Cologne became lost in bad weather and landed in Belgium. Before being arrested by Belgian authorities, the Germans attempted to burn the papers they were carrying, which included copies of the actual invasion plans for Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgian authorities discounted this true information as false because of the ease with which they obtained it.
Multiple Forms of Surprise: Friendly events about which an adversary can be deceived are described in the mnemonic SALUTE-IS, which stands for Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment, Intent, and Style. The maxim indicates that the more of these categories the friendly side can deceive the adversary about, the more likely the adversary is to believe the deception. Conversely, if there are plans and activities about which the adversary is already aware, attempting to deceive him about them is unlikely to succeed. In Operation Bodyguard, the Germans knew there would be an invasion on the coast of France, that it would happen in 1944, and that it would be based in England. They did not know the exact date and the exact location. The Allies concentrated their deception on the SALUTE-IS details the Germans did not know about, and did not attempt to deceive them about what they already knew.
As an example, the intent for Operation Bodyguard was for Germany to allocate forces away from Normandy ("Do"). The perception the Allies wanted to create in the mind of the deception target (Hitler) was that the Allies were planning to invade at Calais ("Think"). The information the Allies conveyed to the target to create the perception included the false radio traffic, dummy equipment displays, and deceptive command messages of the fictional First United States Army Group ("See"). 2b1af7f3a8